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WHY ME?
Walter Dellinger*
When I was asked to write about my first Supreme Court
argument, I wondered what could possibly be interesting about
that subject. Then I realized that there is at least one good
question to ask anyone about his or her first Supreme Court
argument: Why were you hired? That is, why in the world would
anyone entrust their Supreme Court case to someone who had
never argued one?
Supreme Court arguments are highly coveted and a number
of experienced, outstanding advocates regularly appear before
the highest court. The advantages of experience are obvious, and
every party who has a case before the Supreme Court has an
array of choices among that group of attorneys, most usually
backed by excellent law firms and each with a track record that
assures a highly competent performance, and often a stellar one.
Experienced advocates are expensive, of course, but a party with
limited resources can almost always find one or more seasoned
Supreme Court veterans to take the case for a discount-or for
free.
In my case, the first trip to the Supreme Court podium led
through Williamsburg, Virginia. In the fall of 1989, I was a
panelist at the Supreme Court Preview at William & Mary Law
School, which had become a favorite annual event for me. Co-
sponsored by the Institute for the Bill of Rights and the
American Society of Newspapers, the weekend consisted of the
correspondents who covered the Supreme Court and a few law
professors previewing the leading cases of the Term for editorial
writers and interested members of the public.
* Mr. Dellinger, the Douglas B. Maggs Professor at Duke Law School, heads the appellate
practice at O'Melveny & Myers LLP. A former Assistant Attorney General and Head of
the Office of Legal Counsel, he was Acting Solicitor General during the 1996-97 Term.
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In 1989 the Preview was held in late October, and one of
the cases on the list to be discussed was Baliles v. Virginia
Hospital Association.' As a recent grant, it was near the end of
the list of cases to be decided, and the panel assigned to assess
major statutory cases never got to it.
The week after Williamsburg, I was in my office at Duke
when I received a call from Judy Henry, who introduced herself
as one of the Richmond lawyers who had successfully argued
the Virginia Hospital Association case in the Fourth Circuit.
2
She had attended the Supreme Court Preview to learn how the
panelists would assess the prospects for her case in the Supreme
Court, only to be disappointed by the absence of discussion of
VHA. But, she said, she did have the opportunity to hear me
speak at the Conference.
Coming to the point, she said she would like to suggest to
her client the possibility of considering me to argue the case in
the Supreme Court. She, her partner Martin A. Donlan, and
Laurens Sartoris, the head of the Virginia Hospital Association,
had already made several trips to Washington to interview each
of the law firms with leading Supreme Court practitioners, and
were on the verge of choosing one.
It was still possible to consider me, but the selection
process was basically at an end and time was extremely short.
The petitioner's merits brief was soon to be filed, and work
would have to begin immediately on the Association's brief for
respondent, due thirty days later. They needed to finalize their
decision within a couple of days. It was clear that if I wanted to
be considered, I would have to come to Richmond the next
morning to be interviewed.
I told her I would think about whether I could possibly
attempt to do this case, and would phone her back in a couple of
hours. Her call left me dazed. I had never argued a case in the
Supreme Court, or been responsible for briefing one on the
merits. I had argued a few cases in the Courts of Appeal. (A year
earlier, my wife had gone to Washington to be Special Assistant
to the Director of the FBI, and while she did that, I became a
Professor in Residence in the Civil Appellate Section at the
1. 493 U.S. 808 (1989) (granting certiorari).
2. See Va. Hosp. Assn. v. Baliles, 830 F.2d 1308 (4th Cir. 1987); Va. Hosp. Assn. v.
Baliles, 868 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1989).
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Department of Justice in order to get some "real" experience.)
And I had written my share of law review articles and been
active in public affairs, testifying fairly frequently on
constitutional issues before the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees. But the prospect of being responsible for a case in
the United States Supreme Court intimidated me.
And I knew absolutely nothing about the case. So I headed
to the law library, picked up the Federal Reporter in which the
Fourth Circuit's opinion appeared, and wandered down to the
faculty lounge to read it over coffee. As I thumbed through the
opinion walking up the stairs, I immediately saw that the case
was both important and complex.
The Virginia Hospital Association had sued the governor
and various health-care officials of the State of Virginia. Its
member hospitals had provided care to low-income patients
under the Medicaid program and were supposed to be
reimbursed by the state for the reasonable cost of that care,
under something called "the Boren Amendment," with which I
was completely unfamiliar. The Association believed that the
reimbursement methodology used by the state was consistently
unreasonable, and sought to remedy the resulting shortfall by
suing in federal court, where it contended that the state officials
were depriving the hospitals of a "right secured by federal law."
The basis for the hospitals' suit was one of the Reconstruction-
era Civil Rights Acts, Section 1983.'
The idea that there was a federal right to sue in federal
court over these reimbursement disputes was controversial, to
say the least. I knew little about that area of the law, but I knew
that the Rehnquist Court was hardly hospitable (to put it mildly)
to expanding the reach of federal courts, particularly when state
officials were the target of the questionable federal litigation.
By the time I had poured myself a cup of coffee, I had
flipped almost to the end of the Fourth Circuit opinion-and I
was ready to call Judy Henry and tell her there was no point in
my coming to Richmond. There was no way they would hire me
for this case.
As luck would have it, two of my favorite faculty
colleagues, Jeff Powell and Lawrence Baxter, were in the lounge
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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taking a late-afternoon coffee break. I told them what was up.
But then I added that I had already decided not to go to
Richmond to interview for the assignment. I had a full course
load that fall and probably couldn't do justice to the case. And
they would never hire me, anyway.
Both Jeff and Lawrence protested vigorously, insisting that
I shouldn't pass up this opportunity. I could do it: They would
write the brief with me, and, they were convinced, I'd be great at
this.
Their arguments-and especially their offer to help-gave
me pause. But it still made no sense to make a mess of my next
day's schedule by going to Richmond on a fool's errand. The
interview was sure to begin with the prospective client asking
me how many Supreme Court cases I had argued and end
shortly after I replied, "zero." I told Jeff and Lawrence of the
distinguished firms and leading Supreme Court practitioners
already interviewed by the client. What could I possibly say that
would make them want to hire me instead?
A very long silence ensued. Finally, Jeff looked up and
exclaimed "I know why they'll hire you!" Lawrence and I
looked at him skeptically. "And why is that?" I asked.
"Because," said Jeff, "you are going to go in there
tomorrow morning and argue the case to them." He suggested
that I walk in the door, hand them my resume, ask for a podium
and tell them that all I wanted to do was to spend twenty
minutes arguing the case.
"That's one of those truly great ideas," I responded, "that
has one truly critical flaw. I don't know anything about this
case. I have never read the Boren Amendment, which appears to
be critical to the suit, or any of its legislative history, nor any of
the scores of lower-court cases on 'implied federal causes of
action' or any of the relevant opinions of the Supreme Court."
"Not a problem," Lawrence responded. "It's what, five
o'clock, now? To fly to Richmond for a nine o'clock interview
tomorrow, you'll have to leave for the airport no later than six in
the morning. That's what? Twelve or thirteen hours from now?
That's plenty of time in which to learn enough to figure out a
winning argument."
That night was one of my happiest in the law. Lawrence
and Jeff and I tore up the Duke Law Library. By ten o'clock we
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had assembled all the cases and the legislative history. By
midnight we were well on the way to sort of speed reading
through a plethora of apparently relevant opinions. By 3:00 a.m.
we had a concept of how the case ought to be briefed in the
Supreme Court. By the time the sun came up, I had notes for an
oral argument. I went home to shower, shave, and head to the
airport.
The argument I made that morning in the Richmond offices
of Judy Henry's law firm went well beyond the twenty minutes
they had agreed to hear from me. Judy, her partner Marty, and
Larry Sartoris from the Association peppered me with tougher
and tougher questions for more than an hour. We talked about
my lack of Supreme Court experience, and the fact that the
American Hospital Association very much wanted them to hire a
leading Supreme Court practitioner for the case. They said they
would let me know soon.
I thanked them, shook hands, and headed down the hall. As
I waited for the elevator to arrive, Judy and her two colleagues
called me back in. They were ready to decide on the spot. I was
hired.
Now, many Supreme Court arguments later, I often suggest
to prospective clients that they are better off hiring someone
with substantial Supreme Court experience. But I have to admit
that my first Supreme Court argument may have been the best I
ever made.
I'm not sure why that was so. But several possibilities
come to mind. First, I had great help. H. Jefferson Powell is one
of the greatest constitutional scholars I have ever known. His
Harvard Law Review article, The Original Understanding of
Original Intent,4 was already a classic. Lawrence Baxter, who
had come to Duke from South Africa, was one of the great
administrative-law scholars of the British Commonwealth. His
4. 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885 (1985).
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comparative sense of how administrative systems ought to
operate was invaluable to a critical understanding of both the
federal and Virginia processes for administering Medicaid
reimbursement.' Jeff and Lawrence plunged into the work; each
wrote a third of the brief. I undertook to write the part where I
thought we were most likely to lose the case. We worked late
into the night for weeks. When deep snows came one night, we
walked to a hotel right off the Duke campus, and were back at
work early in the morning.
Once, when I hit a brick wall in constructing the argument,
Jeff came down to my office in the wee hours of the morning,
and sat beside me at the keyboard until we came up with a
solution. We alternately typed phrases and sentences on the
keyboard like dual pianists-sometimes like dueling pianists.
But we got through it.
We also had a great collaboration with our Richmond
colleagues who had handled the case below. Judy and Marty had
handled this dispute with the state for many years. There was no
detail they had not mastered. Judy contributed to every page of
the brief, and drafted the critical introductory sections. I learned
on the occasion of my first case a lesson I have followed ever
sense: Make full use of those-both in-house lawyers and
outside counsel-who have handled a case before I was brought
in. One of the worst mistakes Supreme Court counsel can make
is to exclude from the process those who have been with the
case from its inception.
There are no special tricks for preparing for a first Supreme
Court argument. There is, for an advocate's first or twentieth
argument, no substitute for preparation. And I was really
prepared for this argument.
5. Jeff Powell became Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal
Counsel at the Department of Justice from 1993 until 1996 when he returned to Duke. His
latest book is A Community Built on Words: The Constitution in History and Politics (U. of
Chi. Press 2002). Lawrence Baxter left a highly successfully academic career at Duke to
put his ideas about administration into practice. He is now executive vice president and
chief e-commerce officer at Wachovia Corporation.
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And still I was nervous. In my hotel room I worked on my
argument notes until two or three in the morning, then was back
awake by 5:00 a.m. When Court convened, the first order of
business for the Justices was the ceremony in which members of
the Supreme Court bar move the admission of new members in
open court. Partly out of a desperate effort to gain a modicum of
sympathy from the Court, I arranged to move the admission of
my wife to the bar of the Court that morning. The standard form
requires the movant, when addressed by the Chief Justice, to say
precisely: "Mr. Chief Justice and May It Please the Court. I
move the admission of [name of applicant here] of the bar of
[name of State here]. I am satisfied that he/she possesses the
necessary qualifications." Only one alteration is permitted: One
moving the admission of a family member may say, for
example, "my son" or "my father." Movants are admonished
that any. additional statement may lead the Chief Justice to
decline to grant the motion, and instead to take it "under
advisement."
When I was called upon by the Chief to make my motion, I
recklessly added a few words to the script, saying "I move the
admission of Anne Dellinger, my wife of twenty-five years...." I
got away with it, but I wouldn't advise it, and I wouldn't do it
again. (If any member of the Court was the least bit moved by
this familial moment, it certainly didn't show. I was pounded
with questions from the start.)
I didn't realize before the argument that I would be
encountering on the other side one of the finest lawyers ever to
appear before the Court. In addition to the very able deputy
attorney general of Virginia, Claire Guthrie, the case against a
right to sue in federal court would also be argued by the Deputy
Solicitor General of the United States, John Roberts, who is now
a judge on the D.C. Circuit.
I still remember the phone call to my Duke office on the
second Monday in June, 1990. It came from Roberts, as gracious
an opposing counsel as he was a gifted advocate, calling to relay
in person the news from the Supreme Court. "Congratulations,"
he said. "You won, five-to-four." 6
6. See Wilderv. Va. Hosp. Assn., 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
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Editor's Note: Because Walter Dellinger knows only one side of
this story, Richmond lawyer Judy Henry agreed to provide her
recollection of why she and her colleagues chose someone who
had never appeared in the Supreme Court to make his first
argument in their important case. This is her side of the story:
WHY WE HIRED WALTER DELLINGER
Judith B. Henry**
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Baliles v.
Virginia Hospital Association,' my law firm, Crews & Hancock,
had been handling the case for more than three years. Our client,
the Virginia Hospital Association, alleged a violation of a
federal right guaranteed by the Medicaid Act relating to
reimbursement of its member hospitals under the Virginia State
Medicaid Plan. Despite the statutory command that hospitals be
reimbursed for their reasonable costs in providing health-care
services to the poor, no member of the VHA was being
reimbursed for all of the costs it incurred in serving the needy
under Virginia's Medicaid program. Each year, in fact, the gap
between the costs incurred and the reimbursement received was
widening.
My firm had successfully briefed and argued two appeals in
the VHA case at the Fourth Circuit.2 We believed in our case and
in our argument. We were concerned, however, because the
Supreme Court had granted certiorari to review an interlocutory
judgment (which, while not unheard of, is unusual), and also
because the Court reverses a much higher percentage of the
cases in which certiorari is granted than it affirms. The case was
so important and the risk of reversal so great that we decided, in
consultation with our client, to explore the possibility of
associating counsel with Supreme Court experience.
I asked a friend who had clerked with me at the Fourth
Circuit, and who had subsequently clerked at the Supreme
** Judith B. Henry practices appellate law in Richmond, Virginia. She has served as an
adjunct professor at the University of Richmond Law School and as a faculty member in
the Appellate Advocacy Program of the National Institute of Trial Advocacy.
1. 493 U.S. 808 (1989) (granting certiorari).
2. See 830 F.2d 1308 (4th Cir. 1987); 868 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1989).
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Court, to recommend attorneys who had appeared there that he
felt were exceptionally good. He recommended several, all
associated with prominent firms in Washington, and we put
them on our list.
Several weeks later, I attended the annual Supreme Court
Preview at William and Mary, where the panelists were
primarily legal scholars and journalists. One of the
participants-Walter Dellinger, a professor of constitutional law
at Duke-was particularly impressive. I liked his enthusiastic
style and wry sense of humor, and I admired his ability to
analyze a case in a straightforward, logical fashion, to simplify,
without oversimplifying, the issues, and to cut right to the heart
of the matter. After the seminar, I suggested to my colleagues
that Walter Dellinger also be considered as a candidate to argue
the case.
Three of us-Marty Donlan, the lead attorney on the case,
Laurens Sartoris from the VHA, and I-proceeded to interview
the attorneys we had identified as leading candidates. All had
excellent credentials, and all were obviously very capable
attorneys. Professor Dellinger was the last candidate we
interviewed. In all candor, he was the dark horse, because he
was the only candidate who had not argued in the Supreme
Court, and because there was some concern that, as a law
professor, he might be more of an academic than an advocate.
This concern proved to be unfounded. He made the strongest
presentation, and when we adjourned afterward to caucus, we
unanimously voted to offer Walter the job. Fortunately, he
accepted.
We selected Walter for a number of reasons. Although he
was not the only attorney who came prepared to discuss the
specific issues involved in the case, he was the only one who
argued the case to us. He was not only familiar with the issues
that had been briefed and decided below, but he had thought
about how to develop the arguments in the Supreme Court. He
was so knowledgeable, prepared, and articulate that he inspired
confidence, and he communicated an enthusiasm for the issues
involved in our case. We could see how he would advocate our
position before the Court because he was advocating the case to
us. And without having been hired, he already seemed to be
invested in the outcome. This was important both to the client,
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to whom the issues were critically important, and to us, as we
had devoted three and a half years to litigating the case and
absolutely believed that the hospitals' position was correct.
Drafting and revising the VHA brief and preparing for oral
argument proved to be a truly collaborative effort between our
firm and Walter and his colleagues at Duke. We brought to the
table an understanding of hospital costs, of reimbursement
principles, and of the Virginia State Medicaid Plan and its
substantive and procedural shortcomings. Walter brought a
broad-based knowledge of how this private cause of action fit
into the bigger picture of Supreme Court precedent, and of how
to showcase the key legislative history. He also brought his
unique style and flair to the oral argument, which were very
effective.
One moment from the oral argument stands out in
particular. The United States had argued that not only did the
Boren Amendment fail to contain express language stating that
health-care providers had a right to sue, there was also nothing
in the legislative history affirmatively suggesting that providers
would have such a right. Walter responded by first establishing
that lower courts had long recognized the right of providers to
sue, and that Congress was aware of those decisions when it
debated the Boren Amendment. Surely, he suggested, if
Congress were taking away a right that previously existed, one
would expect to see discussion of such a step in the
Congressional debate. But, he argued, "there's not a word in the
legislative history, the extensive legislative history in '80 and
'81, that says, oh, in addition, we're making another major
change. We're extinguishing the right of providers to sue in state
and [f]ederal court." "There's not a word," he went on, "that
Congress was withdrawing a right of which Congress was fully
and clearly aware." Driving home the point, he said, "That is, in
this case, the dog that did not bark."3
By changing the expectations of what one would find in the
legislative history, and flipping the presumption to be drawn
from legislative silence, Walter had taken one of our most
troublesome points-the absence of express legislative
3. Tr. of Oral Argument, Baliles v. Va. Hosp. Assn., 496 U.S. 498 (1990) 16-17 (Jan.
9, 1990) (emphasis added) (available at 1990 U.S. Trans LEXIS 161, *41).
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discussion of a right to sue-and turned it to our advantage.
With his use of the canine metaphor, an allusion to the clue from
4
which Sherlock Holmes solved one of his most famous cases,
Walter made our point both effectively and memorably. Just as
Holmes deduced that the dog was silent because he knew the
man who entered the stable in the middle of the night, Walter
deduced that Congress was silent when it enacted the Boren
Amendment because it knew that it had previously created an
enforeceable right on behalf of providers under the Medicaid
Act, and did not intend to take away that right.
Our confidence in Walter was rewarded when the VHA's
position prevailed five-to-four in the Supreme Court.5 On
remand, the case settled, with the VHA obtaining significant
revisions to the State Plan and substantial increases in the
reimbursement received by Virginia hospitals participating in
the Medicaid program. Across the nation, hospitals that provided
health care for the poor benefited from the Court's decision
confirming their entitlement to challenge inadequate Medicaid
reimbursement.
On a personal note, since working on the VHA case, my
practice has included briefing and arguing numerous appellate
cases, as well as filing amicus briefs, in both state and federal
courts. I appreciate the opportunity I had to work with Walter
Dellinger on a Supreme Court case, and count that experience as
an important milestone in my professional growth.
4. See Arthur Conan Doyle, The Adventure of Silver Blaze (George Newnes, Ltd.
1892) (serialized in Strand Magazine).
5. See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Assn., 496 U.S. 498 (1990).

